WHISTLEBLOWERS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1645
I. DEFINITIONS, CONTINGENCY, DUTY, AND MOTIVATION .................. 1649

A. Definitions, General Usage, and Contingency ............................ 1649
B. Duty and Motivation..................................................................... 1653
II. THE TEXTURE AND CONTENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING LAW .............. 1658
III. REFRAMING WHISTLEBLOWING WITHIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
··············································································································· 1661
A. Evolution in Corporate Law ........................................................ 1662
B. Whistleblowers as Governance Actors......................................... 1666
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1668
INTRODUCTION

Whistleblowers are not among the actors who populate academic
accounts of corporate governance. Nor are whistleblowers visible in formal
governance frameworks consisting of legal and non-legal elements that
enable a firm to operate, all traceable to a corporation's charter and bylaws
adopted in compliance with the law of the state of incorporation. 1 Within a
corporation, whistleblowers may be lower-rank employees, not directors or
officers; they may report their perceptions of wrongdoing to others within
the corporation or inform governmental or other actors who are externally
*
David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Laurel
Salisbury (Duke Law J.D. 2021) for excellent research assistance, and to Veronica Root Martinez,
Andrew Tuch, and participants at the conference for their helpful comments.
1.
For this definition, see Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate law to Corporate Governance, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 5--6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf
Georg Ringe eds., 2018). For a rare exception of scholarship tying whistleblowing explicitly to corporate
governance, see Uboho lnyang, Whistleblowing as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: A Comparative
Analysis of Employee-Whistleblower Protection in the United Kingdom and Nigeria (Jan. 25, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.corn/abstract=3547899. Some scholars engage with the distinct
roles and responsibilities of lawyers as gatekeepers, including duties to report-upward evidence of
material violations of law. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 422 (2008). These inquiries run alongside scholarship on corporate governance, which does not
appear to incorporate them.
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situated. Nonetheless, it is striking how often retrospective accounts of
corporate scandals involve episodes of whistleblowing associated with
governance and compliance failures in one form or another. 2 An influential
quantitative study of major financial frauds found that, in the aggregate,
actors outside the traditional governance cast of characters and formallyappointed gatekeepers accounted for a substantial share of fraud detection,
prompting the authors' observation that it "takes a village" to discern the
presence of much fraudulent activity. 3
Focusing primarily on internal whistleblowing, this article argues that
incorporating whistleblowers into formal governance structures could spur
more proactive involvement by directors in monitoring compliance with law
and regulation. Whistleblowing is significant to internal compliance
functions because it reveals private information suggestive of wrongdoing,4
often furnished by actors within an organization who are not subject to
duties to blow the whistle. Credible whistleblowers create friction that
abrades the plausibility of officially sanctioned narratives. Their reports
(especially when ignored) can furnish valuable documentation in after-thefact investigations of corporate fraud and other major compliance failures,
as can retaliation against whistleblowers.5 By charging the board with
responsibility for adopting and overseeing the implementation of
compliance policies with whistleblower components-as one state has
done 6-formal organizational statutes would underscore the importance of
proactive engagement by directors and increase the likelihood that
whistleblower reports would be used more effectively. To be sure,
whistleblowers can be mistaken and may act from a mixture of motives,
with the consequence that whistleblowing comes with costs as well as
benefits.7 Thus, how best to structure a whistleblowing policy and handle
reports should fall within the board's exercise of good faith business
judgment.
The principal value of internal whistleblowing stems from its creation of
friction, whether to gain the attention of higher-level executives or internal
compliance functions and personnel; internal reports may also be tied to
2.

For examples, see veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, 120

COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2020).
3.
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud?,65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213 (2010). In particular, employees, the media, and industry regulators, not
present in traditional accounts of corporate governance, accounted for forty-three percent of the cases in
which major frauds were detected. Id. at 2226.
Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview, in THE OXFORD
4.
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 981, 995.
See infra text accompanying note 18.
5.

§ 715-b (LexisNexis

2021).

6.

N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW

7.

On the range of whistleblowers' potential motivations, see infra text accompanying notes

51-74.
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revelations to investigative news media and law-enforcement authorities,
which complicates the analysis. To illustrate more concretely, consider one
of recent history's best-known whistleblowers, Tyler Schultz, who found
his first job after graduating from Stanford at Theranos, Inc., working on
the immunoassay team.8 Commenting later-in the wake of his
anonymously-made report to a state regulator, revelations to a board
member and the CEO, and extensive conversations with an investigative
reporter, culminating in the collapse of Theranos with legal repercussions
for its principals-Mr. Schultz divided the company into two realms. 9 These
were "the carpeted world," inhabited by senior management, the board, and
marketing officials, distinct from "the tiled world," a separate domain of
testing laboratories in which lab personnel struggled with malfunctioning
equipment manufactured by Theranos.' 0 By whistleblowing, denizens of the
tiled world can create friction for their colleagues and superiors in the
carpeted world. Whistleblowers' reports call into question assumed factual
premises or disrupt a preferred narrative, whether of business success, legal
compliance, or both. And information revealed by externally-oriented
whistleblowing can arc over the hushed environs of the carpeted world to
reach audiences explicitly charged with publicly-oriented missions. The
friction that whistleblowers create can also help overcome the blind spots
of compliance chiefs themselves who, increasingly drawn from the ranks of
elite lawyers, may overlook risks inherent in the propensities of others to
cheat to meet organizational metrics for performance, having themselves
always succeeded (without cheating) when confronted by challenges.' To
be sure, in more neutral terms whistleblowers furnish private information
suggestive of wrongdoing" and serve as a mechanism to furnish
information that alerts others to suspicions of wrongdoing.' 3 But the act of
whistleblowing-potentially risky and almost always contrarian in one
sense or another, even when required to fulfill a duty-is charged in a
fashion that is understated by more neutral terminology, underscoring its
propensity to generate friction.
The article opens by examining questions of definition, contingency,
duty, and motivation that are associated with whistleblowing.14 Definition
8.
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, In His Own Words: The Theranos Whistleblower,
YouTUBE (May 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wf_2KYRPWQ [https://perma.cc.ME

E2-7D6D].
Id.
9.
10.
Id.
11. Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1599 (2020) (identifying
blind spots of high-performing lawyers in connection with performance metrics that can lead others to
cheat).
12.
Miller, supra note 4, at 995.
13.
Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 939 (2017).
See infra Part I.A.
14.
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is important within statutory structures and common law doctrines that
protect and sometimes reward the revelation of information when requisites
of the definition are satisfied. But not all actors referred to as
"whistleblowers" fit within these formal definitions. Moreover, the causal
connection between a revelation and an outcome-the detection of
wrongdoing-can be highly contingent, as the Theranos example
illustrates. 15 Many whistleblowers are not subject to duties to report, which
situates them outside analytic frameworks in which duty serves as the
central structuring point. 16 And what motivates an individual's decision to
blow the whistle is often unknowable, in particular the extent to which the
decision stems from a calculated weighing of externally-imposed potential
costs and benefits, as opposed to an intrinsic motivation to do the right
thing. 17 Reward and protection systems for whistleblowing implicitly reflect
judgments about motivation but may not optimally account for the
likelihood of adverse consequences feared or suffered by many
whistleblowers. The next portion of the article briefly surveys the
patchwork that comprises whistleblowing law in the United States, stressing
that highly salient scandals generally precede the adoption of
whistleblowing regimes.
Against this background, the article turns to corporate law and
governance in the United States, arguing that both are more dynamic and
less static than some academic accounts assume. Nothing inherent to either
corporate law or governance bars the formal incorporation of mandated
whistleblower protection into organic organizational law. Directors' duties
of loyalty under contemporary Delaware law encompass invigorated
oversight of legal and regulatory compliance. And although the posture of
the compliance function itself-motivated by internal concerns to assure the
appropriate use of assets but also by externally imposed governmental
pressures-is contested within corporate governance practice and
scholarship, its presence and impact are undeniable elements of how
contemporary organizations function. Situated within organizational law,
the legal regime applicable to whistleblowing would have greater coherence
and uniformity across firms incorporated in a particular jurisdiction,
complementing the operation of any whistleblowing laws specific to the
firm's industry or other circumstances. Embedded in organizational law,
whistleblowing would also become freshly visible to lawyers who advise
organizations and furnish an additional formal basis on which lawyers could

15.
16.
17.

See infra text accompanying notes 24-30.
See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-78.
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encourage directors to engage with compliance matters more broadly.' 8
When handled by in-house legal experts, whistleblower reports can function
as red flag indicia of obvious flaws in the company's public disclosures,
undergirding allegations of awareness on the part of senior managers.' 9 The
link between the information revealed by internal whistleblowing and
directors' duties of loyalty strengthens the argument for treating
whistleblowing as a component of corporate governance that should be
formalized via organizational law.
I. DEFINITIONS, CONTINGENCY, DUTY, AND MOTIVATION
Dimensions of whistleblowing as a phenomenon range beyond the law
but nonetheless implicate corporate governance. These include how
whistleblowing is defined and how a whistleblower's report may interact
with other factors in revealing misconduct. Whistleblowers' motivations,
which may be mixed and are often imponderable, also raise fundamental
questions.
A. Definitions, General Usage, and Contingency
How "whistleblower" is defined matters for legal purposes because the
definition is the initial element that triggers the consequences specified by
whistleblowing statutes or common law doctrine. For example, under the
provision added to federal law in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, triggering the statute's antiretaliation protection requires that an individual provide "information
relating to a violation of the securities laws" to the SEC.2 0 Under the
18.
Miller, supra note 4, at 986 (addressing the role of legal counsel in the relationship between
directors' duties of loyalty and compliance matters).

19.

See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L.

REV. 2135, 2184 (2019) (identifying whistleblower reports as "[c]haracteristic red flags"). For a related
example, see Miller, supra note 4, at 989 (discussing UBS AG v. Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig

GMBH [2014] EWHC (Comm) 3615 (Eng.)). Senior bank officials overruled the internal compliance
function to proceed with a risky and potentially lucrative transaction. Although officials did not bear
direct culpability for the conduct of the intermediary, who procured the transaction by bribing the bank's
counterparty, the decision to proceed notwithstanding objections from compliance was likely relevant
to the court's determination that the bank was responsible for contracts procured through bribery.

20.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), interpreted in Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767

(2018). In Digital Realty Trust, the Court acknowledged that a separate provision in Dodd-Frank does
not require that information be conveyed to a governmental authority. Digit. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at
777; see 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1) (defining a "covered employee" as one who "provide[s] ... information
to the employer, the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau, or any other State, local, or Federal,
government authority or law enforcement agency relating to" a violation of law within the CFPB's
jurisdiction). A draft model act released in 2020 by the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) extends anti-retaliation protection to whistleblowers who report only internally.
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provision earlier enacted via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),
protection against retaliation by an employer is afforded to an individual
who provides information or otherwise assists in an investigation of conduct
the individual "reasonably believes constitutes a violation" of criminal fraud
statutes, any SEC rule or regulation, or "any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders." 2 1 The trigger encompasses
individuals who provide assistance to a federal regulatory or lawenforcement agency or to Congress, or internally to any "person with
supervisory authority over the employee." 22 Other statutes, plus
whistleblower-protective common law doctrines, have distinct triggers as
well. 23 Also evident is a disconnect between the general usage of
"whistleblower" and formal definitions that trigger specific consequences.
Consider as an initial prototype, Tyler Shultz. Using a pseudonym, Mr.
Shultz reported concerns about Theranos to the New York Department of
Health because it ran a testing program in which Theranos participated, and
he suspected the company's methodology was improper.24 He also notified
his grandfather (a Theranos director) about his concerns and later sent
lengthy written statements of testing discrepancies to the company's
founder (also its CEO), to which the Chief Operating Officer (COO)
replied.25 The COO's dismissive and hostile tone prompted Mr. Shultz to
resign. 26 Later Mr. Shultz had extensive conversations with a reporter from
the Wall Street Journal that confirmed the gist of the reporter's working
thesis about Theranos and, from an insider's perspective, elaborated on facts
the reporter already knew from other sources. 27 The reporter credited his
conversations with Mr. Schultz and other Theranos insiders with enabling
him to persuade his editors to publish his first article about Theranos. 28
Holding for a moment questions about the relative causal importance of
each of these three communications and their recipients to ultimate
outcomes, which revealed Theranos as a sham and carried potentially
See MODEL WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD & PROT. ACT § 10(1)(d) (N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS AssOC. 2020), ht
tps://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Model-Whistleblower-Award-and-Protection-Act-A
s-Adopted-by-the-NASAA-Membership.pdf (protecting against retaliation "an individual" who does
any lawful act "in making disclosures to a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such
other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct) regarding matters subject to the jurisdiction of" the SEC or the state securities regulator).

§ 1514A(a)(1).

21.
22.

15 U.S.C.
Id

23.
24.

See infra text accompanying notes 83-102.
JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 195

(2018).
25.
26.

Id. at 195-96.
Id at 197.

27.
Id. at 287, 301. The reporter's initial lead came from a practicing pathologist and amateur
blogger, who thought Theranos's claims "sounded too good to be true." Id. at 219, 223.

28.

Id. at 287.
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adverse legal consequences for its principals, Mr. Shultz is a prototypical
whistleblower. As a lower-level employee, he reported his concerns both
internally and to an external regulator.29 Moreover, the content concerned
misrepresentations about testing accuracy that Theranos made to users of its
blood-testing services and investors. 30 But in this concatenated sequence,
what most likely spelled doom for Theranos was publication of the results
31
in the Wall Street Journal.
Some individuals termed "whistleblowers" do not match this prototype
and may not be within the set of actors specifically protected by
whistleblowing law. In Akorn, Inc. v. FreseniusKabi A G,32 revelations that
a manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals had major lapses in regulatory
compliance enabled its acquisition partner to exit its obligation to close their
merger deal.3 3 The lapses contravened representations and warranties given
in the merger agreement and constituted a Material Adverse Event (MAE)
as defined in the agreement.34 Much noted by commentators as the first case
in which a Delaware court permitted a merger partner to walk away on the
basis of an MAE,35 the source of the revelations to the merger partner goes
unmentioned. As characterized by the court, an anonymous "whistleblower"
sent a letter to the prospective acquiror detailing regulatory non-compliance
in connection with the merger target's sole promising drug in development,
then followed up in another letter with more details including specifics
about deficiencies in quality assurance that contravened FDA regulations. 36
A formal explanation for why whistleblowers are often employees is that they can acquire
29.
information at relatively low cost, given that they gather much of it as a byproduct of their work. Dyck,
Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2214. Other actors whose conduct may reveal the presence of fraud
can confront much higher costs. Thus, although short-sellers may gain by trading on a belief that the
market overvalues a security on the basis of non-public information pointing to fraud, short-sellers-as
outsiders to the corporation-acquire salient information at higher cost than employees, plus incur the
cost of investing capital in the short. Id.
CARREYROU, supra note 24, at 273.
30.
For a narrative of events in the aftermath of publication, see id. at 282-83 (noting that
31.
publication "ratcheted up pressure" on the federal regulator to take action, which occurred when it
"confirmed that there were serious problems with Theranos's blood tests" and "deemed the problems
grave enough to put patients in immediate danger").

32.
2018).
33.
34.
35.

No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff'd, 198 A.3d 724 (Del.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *47-2.
For a selection of law-firm commentary, see Edward B. Micheletti & Arthur R. Bookout,

Analyzing Akorn: Delaware's First M&A Termination Under Material Adverse Effect, SKADDEN, APPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publi
cations/2018/10/analyzing-akorn [https://perma.cc/TRC6-KRW4]; Delaware Chancery Court Finally
Finds an MAE, JONES DAY (Oct. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2018/10/delaware-chan
cery-court-finally-finds-an-mae [https://perma.cc/R56Z-KHD3]; RICHARD SLACK & JOSHUA M.
GLASSER, WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, THE MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT LANDSCAPE AFTER
AKORN V. FRESENIUS, https://www.weil.com/-/media/mailings/2018/q3/securitieslitigation_alert_ 18

10_30_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5A4-BPMK].
Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *27.
36.
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The merger partner presented the letters to the target and conducted its own
investigation into the allegations.37 Clearly the revelations were
consequential to the aftermath, 38 but anonymous reports to a transaction
partner fall outside prototypes of whistleblowing that require reporting to a
regulator or law-enforcement authority.39
Separately, some individuals use indirect means to draw attention to
revelations of suspected wrongdoing, as did the Akorn whistleblower
(assuming she or he was or had been an employee of the merger target). 40
More famously, in Dirks v. SEC, former officers of an insurance company
that engaged in fraudulent practices were unsuccessful in activating state
insurance regulators. 4 1 Seeking to reveal the fraud, they shared their
information with a securities analyst, who investigated and discussed his
findings with clients and investors, who sold the company's stock.42 The
drastic price drop that followed led the state insurance authority to impound
the company's records. 43 This was followed by a complaint from the SEC,
which also investigated whether by sharing his findings and the insiders'
revelations, the analyst illegally tipped inside information to his clients and
investors. 44 The Court held that the analyst did not act illegally because the
former officers did not act fraudulently when they tipped the analyst. 45 They
were motivated to reveal the fraud, not by the expectation of receiving a
quid pro quo or personal gain in another form. 46 In a more recent example
of indirection, an Uber employee's blog post-which detailed experiences
of sexual harassment by a manager and dismissiveness from Uber's human
resources department-triggered board investigation, through a special
committee, into Uber's workplace environment and employment
practices. 47 The committee's investigation led to structural changes at the
board level, plus a directive that the company's ongoing search for a new
37.

Id.

Akorn filed a Chapter 11 petition in May 2020 to facilitate the sale of its business and resolve
38.
a "litigation-related overhang[]." See Akorn to Use Voluntary Chapter 11 Process to Position Business
for Long-Term Success, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (May 20, 2020, 11:52 PM), https://www.pmewswire.co
m/news-releases/akom-to-use-voluntary-chapter- ll -process-to-position-business-for-long-term-succes

s-301063336.html [https://perma.cc/3R7C-6JAL].
39.
Along the same lines, an individual identified in the media as the "whistleblower" concerning
a particular episode of corporate wrongdoing is not necessarily the actor who brought the wrongdoing
to light. Another actor may have already initiated a chain of events that uncovered the wrongdoing. See
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2218.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *2.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 665-66.

46.
Id. at 667. Thus the Court did not need to resolve whether the tipping constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. See infra text accompanying notes 54- 56.
47.
Martinez, supra note 2, at 293-94.
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COO focus on candidates able to improve institutional culture. 48 Although
effective in this incident, communicating information through a blog post
may be less targeted than the trigger defined by SOX for internal reporting
to a person with supervisory authority. 49 Moreover, the content of the blog
post may not have implicated SOX's focus on fraud and securities law
violations.
In short, not all communications referred to as instances of
whistleblowing fit within the defined components of statutory provisions.
Likewise, the causal links between a whistleblower report and any particular
outcome can be complex even when-but for the information provided by
the whistleblower-the outcome most likely would not have occurred, at
least not as soon as it did.
B. Duty and Motivation
Duty and motivation, potentially linked in this context, are separately
important to understanding legal responses to whistleblowing. In Reinier
Kraakman's influential account of ex ante strategies for legal enforcement,
an enforceable duty is essential as the mechanism that enables "private
parties to avert misconduct when they detect it."5 0 Kraakman argues that
gatekeeper strategies-utilizing private actors who can disrupt misconduct
by withholding co-operation from wrongdoers, as epitomized by financial
auditors-are superior to whistleblowers who are subject to a duty to report
misconduct.51 This is because gatekeeping threatens only a withheld reward
while mandatory whistleblowing additionally imposes on its targets costs of
"legal defense, reputational loss, and possible penalties or civil damages."
Given the risk of erroneous whistleblowing (however motivated), its targets
have incentives to withhold information and avoid actors who may betray
them, while potential whistleblowers, fearing the personal consequences,
may avoid reporting wrongdoing.5 3 Proceeding within a duty-centric
framework, Kraakman's analysis does not address implications that follow
when whistleblowers (like the prototype, Tyler Shultz) are not subject to a
duty to report suspected misconduct. To be sure, by blowing the whistle an
actor may breach duties owed to others, as examined below.
Whistleblowers' motivations raise two distinct issues: (1) the relevance
of motivation to how the law characterizes a communication, and (2) the
48.
49.

Id. at 294.
15 U.S.C.

50.

Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2

J.L. ECON.
51.
52.
53.

§ 1514A(a)(I).

& ORG. 53, 57 (1986).
Id. at 58-90.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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significance of motivation in structuring protections and rewards for
whistleblowers. Although the motivation with which a whistleblower acts
can have direct legal consequences for that individual, as in Dirks v. SEC,54
sometimes motivation is irrelevant. Acting with a public-regarding
motivation-to reveal fraud-obviated the Dirks officers' liability for
illegal tipping under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.55 Given
that statutory premise for liability, it was unnecessary for the Court to
examine whether, by making disclosure with the public-regarding objective
of halting an ongoing fraud, the officers breached their fiduciary duties to
the corporation. Most likely, revealing the information breached their
duties. 56 Whether they might be shielded from liability by a common law
privilege is an underexplored question. In tort law, conduct otherwise
tortious can be privileged in particular circumstances, as when an actor's
conduct serves some interest of the public and the harm caused by the
conduct is offset by the importance of that interest.5 7 The complex of
statutes and common law doctrines that protect whistleblowers from
retaliation by employers reflects a widely-held public commitment that
should constitute a basis for privilege against breach of fiduciary duty.
Privilege aside and distinct from any contractual obligations of
confidentiality, the officers in Dirks-even as former officers-were agents
who owed the corporation-their principal-a fiduciary duty of loyalty that
encompassed a specific duty not to use the principal's confidential
information for their own purposes or those of a third party. 58 Not absolute,
the duty is not breached when an agent reveals to law enforcement that the
principal is committing or is about to commit a crime or informs a third
party who will be harmed by the principal's illegal conduct. 59 And, as noted
above, whistleblowing-protective statutes and common law doctrine would
also be a basis for privilege. But in general, within the framework of
common law agency, an agent's well-motivated departures from the
principal's known preferences breach the agent's fiduciary duties to the
principal. 60 Likewise, the Akorn insider's revelations may have been well
54.
55.

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 653-54, 667.

&

56.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2)(agent's duty "not to use or communicate
confidential information of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party").
57.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (defining "privilege"). Breach
of fiduciary duty can sound in tort, resulting in liability to the person to whom the duty was owed. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 16 (AM. L. INST. 2020).
58.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
59.
Id. at § 8.05 cmt. c.
60.
Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 329-30 (Andrew S. Gold
Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). Arguments for a less adamantine framing of an agent's duty extend only to
situations in which an agent's conduct furthers a principal's known objectives and does not sacrifice
economic benefit for the principal. See id. at 329.

2021 ]

WHISTLEBLOWERS

1655

motivated, but sharing the information with a merger partner surely
contravened preferences shared by the target's shareholders and directors to
proceed with the merger, sharpened by severe business reverses the
company suffered following the date of the merger agreement.
In contrast, a whistleblower's motivation is irrelevant to analysis under
SOX and Dodd-Frank. What matters under SOX is whether the individual
"reasonably believes" the information concerns a violation of federal
prohibitions on fraud or SEC rules and regulations. Under Dodd-Frank, the
dispositive question is whether the individual provided "information
relating to" securities law violations to the SEC. It is beside the point why
the individual determined to provide the information. A public-minded
motivation to reveal wrongdoing may co-exist with resentment against coemployees or superiors, the desire to exact revenge or achieve fame, or a
combination of many motives, including these. 6' Seeking to mitigate the
risk of liability when the information may implicate the whistleblower can
motivate disclosures, 62 although whistleblowing by itself does not confer
amnesty when it pertains to an individual's prior criminal conduct. 63 This
fact may help explain why employee-whistleblowers tend to inhabit the tiled
world, situated lower in an organization's hierarchy. On the one hand,
higher-ups, including denizens of the carpeted world, could be sources of
better information about wrongdoing; on the other hand, that information
may well inculpate them as direct and knowledgeable participants in
criminal conduct. 64 Motivation is also irrelevant to the legal consequences
of whistleblowing when an individual has a duty to reveal information, as
would a gatekeeper with an obligation to make disclosure, such as an auditor
who fulfills a duty imposed by federal securities law. 65 Nor does a
whistleblower's motivation necessarily bear on the quality of the
whistleblower's report, something of a theoretical issue in any event given
the imponderable nature of subjective motivation in this context.
61.
See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2215 (noting the mix of considerations that
motivate whistleblowing); see also Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell & Aaron Stenz, Bad Agent, Good
Citizen?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1644-45 (2020) (stressing variety of motivations for lawyer

whistleblowers).
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2245 (reporting that in around 35% of cases in
62.
study, avoiding liability appeared relevant to whistleblower).
Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower's Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
63.
2215, 2227 (2017) ("[W]histleblowing ... does not confer amnesty." (quoting Julie Rose O'Sullivan,
"PrivateJustice" and FCPA Enforcement: Should the SEC Whistleblower ProgramInclude a Qui Tam

Provision?,53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 78 (2016))).
64.
Id. at 2219.
65.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 330-31 (2007) (differentiating between gatekeepers, who
generally report within organizations, and whistleblowers, who may report to the public or to authorities,
and terming auditors, subject to statutory whistleblowing obligations, an instance of "nonvolunteer"

whistleblowers).
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Assumptions or theories about whistleblowers' motivations are crucial
to the operation and effectiveness of legal doctrines and other structures that
afford protection against retaliation or offer financial incentives for
whistleblowing, such as Dodd-Frank. All operate against a backdrop in
which the practical consequences for known whistleblowers can be severe.
One quantitative study found that monetary incentives are associated with
more cases in which whistleblowing leads to the revelation of major
financial fraud, contrasting fraud cases in the health care sector with all
others. 66 The study-focused on cases prior to Dodd-Frank-attributes this
difference to the fact that successful fraud claims originating in the healthcare sector are more likely to be eligible for monetary rewards under the
federal False Claims Act due to the significant governmental presence in
procurement. 67 But overall the study finds it "surprising" that employees
decide to blow the whistle given its association with wrongful discharge
claims. 68
Less formally, identified whistleblowers often find themselves
ostracized and shunned in many ways. 69 For Tyler Shultz, the prototypical
whistleblower introduced earlier, a highly atypical aftermath followed his
revelations about Theranos. To be sure, he reports that his parents incurred
$400,000 in legal fees when Theranos responded aggressively through its
lawyers, threatening and demanding the execution of non-disclosure
agreements.74 But post-Theranos Mr. Shultz stayed in Silicon Valley in the
medical-testing business, co-founding a startup to develop a line of research
from his time at Stanford and raising $37 million in early-stage venture
capital funding secured in 2018.71 That his experience is widely viewed as
exceptional underscores the overhang of well-known adverse consequences
in shaping whistleblowers' motivations. Additionally, many insiders who
are aware of indicia of illegal conduct lack resources of the nature and
magnitude available to Mr. Shultz through his family and other
relationships.
Refraining whistleblowing as an acknowledged component of corporate
governance-in particular, as a source of private information that materially
facilitates the effectiveness of internal control systems--can help overcome
powerful norms against being seen as a "rat" or a "snitch," and thus
vulnerable to retaliation by wrongdoers as well as by other actors "who

66.

Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supranote 3, at 2215.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2245.
Id.
Id. at 2251.

71.

For details, see Flux Biosciences, PITCHBOOK, https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/267

CARREYROU,

supra note 24, at 287.

820-66#overview [https://perma.cc/3TJP-v9VQ].
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enforce the social code." 72 Situating the response to whistleblower reports
within the board's suite of responsibilities should add credibility to
assurances a corporation provides employees by garnering the attention of
high-level governance actors and the cohort of lawyers who advise them.
Along these lines, some corporations now define whistleblowing as an
obligation, not just a right. 73 In experimental research, when whistleblowing
is cast as a duty, more of it occurs, arguably due to the increased social status
ascribed to whistleblowers subject to duties to report. 74 Additionally,
credible assurances that internally-made disclosures will remain
confidential and will be investigated by personnel who are organizationally
distant from those accused of wrongdoing should reduce perceived risks of
retaliation and signal that the value of whistleblowing is acknowledged. 75
Otherwise, it is open to debate how powerfully financial incentives can
operate, especially for higher-placed (often older) insiders who have much
to lose if excluded from the corporation that employs them or the industry,
or demeaned and demoted in rank and status within them.
Separately, by rewarding whistleblowers, might the law interfere with an
individual's intrinsic motivation to blow the whistle because it is the right
thing to do? Raising this possibility, Emad Atiq questions the impact on
financially-incentivized whistleblowers themselves, who might regret
having become even more "beholden to financial interests." 76 On the other
hand, recasting whistleblowing as a duty owed to a corporation or
encompassing it as an acknowledged component of corporate governance
structures might strengthen-or "crowd in"-intrinsic motivation through a
strong signal of encouragement. Either (or both) could also trigger the
ethical value of fulfilling one's obligations, whether imposed directly by
positive law or via a corporation's internal rules and policies.7 7
72.

Miller, supra note 4, at 996 n.50.

73.
Id. at 996.
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
74.
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1206

(2010).
75.

See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory

Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 615 (2014)
(observing that higher-quality tips from higher-placed sources may require strengthening protections
against retaliation, not increased bounties).
76.
Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal
Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097 (2014).
77.
See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a
Difference?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., forthcoming Apr. 2021) (manuscript at 21-22) (on file with author) (acknowledging that heavy
emphasis on compliance may potentially interfere with intrinsic motivation while also acknowledging
that compliance and respect for the rule of law are themselves important ethical values). For an overview
of arguments and social-science evidence concerning crowding-out and crowding-in effects, see
Deborah A. DeMott, The Domains of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligations and
IntrinsicMotivation, 62 wM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (2021).
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Additionally, and distinct from the power of social sanctions against
whistleblowing, the overall efficacy of reward programs in generating
information useful to law-enforcement agencies (including the SEC)" is
tied to the robustness of anti-retaliation assurances through a complex and
highly individualized motivational mix of loss-aversion and gain-seeking
that's hard to unscramble.
II. THE TEXTURE AND CONTENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING LAW
The evolution of whistleblowing law in the United States fits within a
larger pattern that typifies the ongoing development of corporate law and
corporate governance as articulated in two recent accounts. In its 2017
edition the foundational book The Anatomy of CorporateLaw concludes
with a chapter, Beyond the Anatomy. 79 Its authors, acknowledging the
book's ahistorical and functional methodology, in one section venture
"Beyond the Present" of corporate law and see a "fundamental rethink of
corporate laws . . . under way in many countries, partly as a reaction to
corporate scandals and the alleged failure of corporate governance at
financial institutions" that preceded the world-wide financial crisis of 20082010.80 Likewise on the table as current issues are "the goals of corporate
law," which for these authors implicate the design of regulatory measures
to assure that the social costs of corporate activity are reflected in
corporations' financial results.8 1 Writing in the same era about the evolution
of corporate governance as a path-dependent process not isolated from shifts
in broader social and economic concerns, Ronald Gilson observes that
although much of corporate governance is not dictated or specified by law,
governance matters may become legally specified "when legislatures
conclude that self-generated governance is less effective than social welfare
demands." 8 2 Whistleblowing law develops responsively and to a
considerable extent episodically, whether through legislative enactment or
common law adjudication, generally following in the wake of outrage at
wrongdoing known to insiders within organizations. A sketch of that
evolution follows.

78.
See Amanda M. Rose, CalculatingSEC WhistleblowerAwards: A TheoreticalApproach, 72
VAND. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2019) (arguing the initial premise in SEC's calculation of awards should be
"help[ing] the SEC in its deterrence mission," with the implication that awards should be structured to
reward tips that create more benefits than costs for SEC).
John Armour, Luca Enriques, Mariana Pargendler & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Beyond the
79.

Anatomy, in THE ANATOMY
(3d ed. 2017).
80.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 271.
81.
82.
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Gilson, supranote

1, at 8.
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Historical accounts of whistleblowing law trace it to 1863. Congress
adopted (and President Lincoln signed) the False Claims Act (FCA) 83 when
it became clear that many suppliers had provided substandard services and
goods to Union troops in the midst of the Civil War.84 From its beginning,
the FCA has included a provision authorizing qui tam suits brought by
whistleblowers on behalf of the United States. Under the FCA as revised in
1986, a whistleblower may receive up to thirty percent of the proceeds of a
lawsuit, recovered from the defendant in a judgment on a claim stemming
from fraud in federal spending, procurement, or contracting. 85 Thus, bounty
or reward systems to incentivize whistleblowing have a long lineage in the
United States that predate statutory anti-retaliation protections. For
employees of the federal government, anti-retaliation measures date to 1912
and the Lloyd-LaFollette Act8 6 (later amended by the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978), enacted in response to Presidential "gag orders" that Congress
understood to stymie its ability to obtain relevant information from federal
civil-service employees. 87 Further strengthening the position of
whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989 created
the Office of Special Counsel to investigate allegations of illegal personnel
practices, among other measures. 88 In 2012, the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act addressed the WPA's lack of specified remedies and
clarified the breadth of disclosures protected by the statutory regime, which
now applies to disclosures of violations of law, rule, or regulation, or "gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety." 89
Notwithstanding their present breadth, these statutes apply only to
employees of the federal government, with non-identical counterparts in

83.

Presently codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.

84.
The False Claims Act, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., https://www.whistleblowers.org/prote
ct-the-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/B83X-7UH4].

§ 3730(d)(2).

85.

31 U.S.C.

86.

The Lloyd-LaFollette Act was added as section six to the Postal Service Appropriations Act

of 1912, ch. 389,

§ 6, 37

Stat. 539, 555, in response to "gag orders" from Presidents Taft and (Teddy)

Roosevelt that prohibited employees of executive branch departments from seeking to influence
legislation except through departmental heads. The Senate perceived the orders as enabling the
Executive Branch to bar Congress from access to sources of information that should be open to it. The
Act applied to civil-service employees and assured their rights to petition Congress or furnish
information to it. It provided safeguards against the arbitrary dismissal of civil servants who attempted
to communicate with Congress. For background, see https://whistleblowersblog.org/2012/08/articles/go

vemment-whistleblowers/happy-birthday-lloyd-la-follette-act/.
87.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7211.
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended
88.
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
89.
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, sec. 103, §

2302(a)(2), 126 Stat. 1465, 1466.

1660

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1645

state statutes that are mostly focused on protecting against retaliation. 90 For
private-sector employees, statutory protection for whistleblowers at the
federal level has a much shorter history that begins with SOX in 2002. As
elaborated above, like Dodd-Frank, SOX applies only when a
whistleblower's report pertains to specified types of misconduct.
Additionally, statutes applicable to specific industries may address
whistleblowing but also contain significant limitations on coverage. For
example, although the health and pharmaceutical industries are heavily
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) through authority
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FFDCA
does not create whistleblower protections applicable to the pharmaceutical
and cosmetic industries. 91 In 2011, the Food Safety Modernization Act
authorized whistleblower-protective rules for the food industry. 92 Thus, the
extent of legally-mandated protection for employee whistleblowers in the
pharmaceutical industry and in health care turns on applicable state law. On
the other hand, the oldest of the federal statues-the FCA-may create a
viable whistleblower claim when misconduct implicates false claims for
payment by the federal government and the employee-whistleblower
proceeds with a qui tam action. 93
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, whistleblower legislation was preceded by
90.
scandals and a series of public inquiries. These focused on the collapse of the BCCI bank and a
catastrophic incident at a recreational facility in which an employee who identified safety lapses was
dismissed after reporting them to management. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin

& David Lewis, Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public
Interest,44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 883 (2004). The Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA), enacted in 1998,
creates an express exception to the duty of confidentiality that an employee owes to an employer. See
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/998/23/content
s [https://perma.cc/K3Y8-9T5V], incorporatedinto the Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18 (UK), https:
subsequently
[https://perma.cc/XLQ7-93JZ],
//www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/contents

modified by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/2013/24/contents [https://perma.cc/KZ6C-SQ25]. PIDA, which offers no financial incentives for
whistleblowing, in most instances requires that internal reporting precede reporting to external
audiences. PIDA's structure requires litigation before expert employee tribunals with costs beyond the
reach of most employees; the statute recommends but does not require that employers adopt internalreporting procedures. For these criticisms, among others, see ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. FOR
WHISTLEBLOWING, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE PERSONAL COST OF DOING THE RIGHT THING AND THE
COST TO SOCIETY OF IGNORING IT (2019), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/88dO4c_9754e54bc641443db

902cd963687cb55.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR68-DS53].
91.
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i.
92.
See id. § 399d.
93.

For a prominent example, see United States ex rel. Eckard v. GlaxoSmithKline, No. 04-CV

-10375-JLT (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2011) (Bloomberg Law). Eckard involved false claims arising from
chronic and serious deficiencies in quality control at a manufacturing plant. This led to the public release
of adulterated and defective pharmaceutical drugs that harmed those who bought them as well as false
claims for payment by federal and state purchasers, as well as payment under Medicare and state
Medicaid programs. The whistleblower-the corporation's manager for quality control-internally
reported code violations that were not adequately investigated, then was downsized out of a job. The qui

tam case settled for $600 million plus interest. See Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n v. GlaxoSmithKline
LLC , 417 F. Supp. 3d 531, 548 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
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On the state level, the District of Columbia and all fifty states have some
form of whistleblower-protective statute. These vary widely in content and
scope 94 but are important protections for at-will employees. 95 Many statutes
were enacted in the wake of specific incidents when lawmakers believed
that employee reporting could have prevented or ameliorated harm. 96 Seven
states require a whistleblower to report internally before turning to an
external channel. 97 Common law doctrines may also afford protection; in
most but not all states9 8 wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is
tortious. 99 As applied to whistleblowers, the tort protects employees who
report or inquire about conduct believed to be illegal or to violate an
established professional or occupational code of conduct, 100 in particular
one that threatens injury to a public interest as opposed to harm internalized
to the corporation itself. 10 1 The wrongful-discharge tort, plus state
whistleblower-protective statutes, undergird the argument advanced above
that although employee-whistleblowing may theoretically breach fiduciary
duties of loyalty and confidentiality, it should be protected by privilege
under common law principles of tort law.' 0 2
In general, the fragmentary and episode-driven quality of whistleblowing
law in the United States undercuts its capacity to facilitate effective systems
of internal control and to overcome deeply entrenched opposition to
organizational actors who reveal evidence suggestive of others' misconduct,
whether externally or through internal channels. Acknowledging
whistleblowing within formal organizational law would contribute an
overlay of uniformity, at least as across business entities formed and
governed under any particular state's law.
III. REFRAMING WHISTLEBLOWING WITHIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Recast as actors within a corporate governance framework,
whistleblowers, the private information they reveal, and the frictions they
create could facilitate the ability of directors and senior officers to better
assure that the organization complies with positive law. Their ability to do
so is all the more pressing in an era when, as Donald Langevoort writes, a
94.

For many specifics, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of

State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000).
95.

Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the

Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875, 888 (2002).
96.

Callahan et al., supra note 90, at 882.

97.
98.
100.

Id. at 891.
New York is a significant exception. See Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 2012).
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
Id. § 5.02(e).

101.
102.

For the leading precedent, see Foley v. Interactive DataCorp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.

99.
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parade of "all the more garish" corporate wrongdoing seems to co-exist with
widespread adoption of internal compliance systems. 103 This section opens
by sketching two recent developments in corporate law. In their
articulations of directors' duties, Delaware courts have reinvigorated the
component of directors' duty of loyalty that focuses on legal and regulatory
compliance, assigning a proactive role to the board. 104 Separately, in one
jurisdiction, organizational law explicitly addresses whistleblowing and
subjects directors to specific responsibilities. 105 The section then elaborates
on why whistleblowers should be formally embraced as components of
corporate governance. While not a panacea for corporate misconduct, a
broader understanding of governance mechanisms and actors expands the
potential range of responses to the risk of wrongdoing.
A. Evolution in CorporateLaw
Like corporate governance, corporate law itself is less static than some
academic accounts suggest and is at least potentially responsive to external
circumstances. To be sure, it is always difficult-writing in the present-to
discern blips versus developments with staying power. With that caveat,
consider recent shifts in the Delaware jurisprudence of directors' duties as
they bear on compliance with positive law. In 1996, the Court of Chancery
famously articulated a fiduciary duty of oversight regarding legal and
regulatory compliance in the Caremark case.'0 6 A decade later, the
Delaware Supreme Court situated the duty as a component of directors' duty
of loyalty, with the important consequence that a director could not be
shielded against liability for monetary damages on a Caremark claim
through exculpatory language in the corporation's charter, in contrast with
a claim grounded in a breach of the duty of care. 107 Assessing developments
over the next decade, scholarly commentators find grounds for pessimism
about the potential of Caremark claims and their potential impact on
directors' engagement with compliance.1 08 Cases from that era, few
103. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 942. To be sure, it is likely impossible to know the full extent
to which internal compliance measures discovered wrongdoing. An earlier study (using large reported
financial frauds from 1996-2004) estimated that 34% of frauds were detected internally but also
cautioned this proportion may be an underestimate. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supranote 3, at 2225.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 103-118.

105.
106.

N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021).
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

107. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Exculpatory clauses are permitted to the extent
consistent with the relevant provision in Delaware' corporation statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §

102(b)(7) (2021).
108. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 2075, 2113-14 (2016) (noting "episodic" judicial intervention, evisceration of directors' duty of
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resulting in liability, 09 imposed a pleading threshold that required the
allegation of facts supporting an inference that a majority of the board
intentionally caused a violation of the law or consciously disregarded it."4
Other events in the course of a lawsuit might also defeat liability on an
otherwise meritorious claim.' For conduct occurring deeper within the
organization, liability risks for directors were few unless the facts were
egregious and the corporation had no board-installed compliance system at

all.
Both the tone and content of the Supreme Court's analysis of Caremark
claims shifted in 2019's Marchand v. Barnhill, in which an ice-cream
manufacturer's allegedly shoddy manufacturing practices led to a listeria
outbreak that contaminated its product, causing three deaths plus an
operational shutdown and liquidity crisis for the company."2 Qualitycontrol issues were reported to members of management, who did not report
them to the board until the company issued its first product recalls; the board
thereafter engaged in no in-depth discussion.' 1 3 The court held that the
company's nominal compliance with food-safety regulations did not suffice
to establish that the board had implemented a system to monitor safety
issues at the board level; the complaint alleged an absence of board-level
committees or practices to inform the board about safety concerns." 4 And
ice cream was the company's sole product, for which food-safety risks
carried grave consequences for human health." 5 Professional commentary
on Marchand treats it as a significant development, one law-firm memo

care by business judgment rule, and "retreat" of corporate law from turf now occupied by internal
compliance functions); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 941 (characterizing Caremark as an impetus to
"just do something" that invited a check-the-box approach to compliance); Miller, supra note 4, at 986
(noting "curiously ambivalent quality" in Delaware's approach to compliance, imposing significant
obligations on directors but following through with liability only when directors do not "manifest even
minimal efforts").
109. Miller, supranote 4, at 986 n.14 (generalizing that cases generating liability typically involve
"egregious facts" plus "companies operated out of countries with poor reputations for corporate
governance").

110.

City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 60 n.75 (Del. 2017).

111. See In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL
2176479, at *20-21 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2011) (directors who knew that corporation had already pled
guilty to criminal charges stemming from unsafe operating conditions and had suffered other adverse
consequences acted inconsistently with duty of loyalty by permitting senior management to continue
adversarial relationship with regulators and by failing to assure that corporation adopted policies to
comply with safety regulations); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d

484, 497 (Del. Ch. 2017) (dismissing derivative claims because plaintiffs lost standing due to
corporation's merger, noting that Caremark claim would otherwise have been viable).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
Id. at 812-14.
Id. at 813, 822-23.
Id. at 809.
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concluding that it "[b]reathes [n]ew [l]ife" into Caremarkclaims. 16 Given
the case's unquestionably bad facts, Marchand'spotential resuscitation of
directors' liability should not be overstated, but the court's opinion seems
almost nonplussed at times by the obliviousness to risk displayed by the
corporation's senior management and its directors." 7 But the facts alleged
sufficed to raise an inference that the directors failed even to attempt to
assure the presence of "reasonable information and reporting systems" as
Caremarkrequires, perhaps scaling back a bit on standards for establishing
conscious disregard and instead emphasizing the nature and magnitude of

the risks involved.1 18
Marchandis too recent as a precedent to assess its full force, let alone its
staying power over time, but the Court of Chancery treats it as refocusing
attention on the gravity of a particular compliance risk in the environment
in which a corporation operates. In In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative
Litigation, the directors of a biopharma start-up allegedly ignored multiple
warning signs concerning the efficacy in fighting cancer of the company's
most promising drug in development, which violated internal clinical trial
protocols and FDA regulations.11 ' Under Marchand, these allegations
supported a Caremarkclaim because they concerned a "mission critical"
regulatory compliance risk for which Marchandrequires that the directors
exercise their oversight function "more rigorously."12 0 To be sure,
whistleblower reports do not figure in either case, but both cases may be
indicia of a turn in corporate-law jurisprudence toward more vigorous
engagement with the importance of legal and regulatory compliance. In both
cases this turn was framed as "mission critical" to the corporation's ongoing
viability as a business. And in both, the risks implicated human life and
12 1
health, not just business risks for the corporation.
116. FREDERICK B. THOMAS, JODI A. SIMALA, ANDREW J. NOREUIL, RYAM H. FERRIS & THOMAS
C. SANTORA., MAYER BROWN, LEGAL UPDATE: DELAWARE DECISION BREATHES NEW LIFE INTO BAD
FAITH CLAIMS AGAINST DIRECTORS (2019), https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectivesevents/publications/2019/07/delaware-decisionnew.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET3E-JFJB].
117. For example, senior management allegedly "turned a blind eye to red and yellow flags"
waved before it, not just by internal tests but by food-safety regulators "until it was too late." Marchand,
212 A.3d at 811. For its part, the board allegedly made no effort to establish "reasonable compliance
system[s] and protocols" concerning "the obviously most central consumer safety and legal compliance
issue facing the company." Id. at 824.
118. Id. at 822 n.106 (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996)).
119. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *l
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); see also Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *16 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (finding facts alleged in complaint created pleading-stage inference of bad-faith
conduct by members of audit committee in failing to provide oversight in light of company's history of

flawed financial reporting (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821)).
120. In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13.
121. For further discussion of the resurgence of Caremarkclaims and the causes, see Roy Shapira,
A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1855, 1865-79 (2021).
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Corporate law also evolves at the level of change in organizational
statutes that enable corporate formation and furnish both mandatory and
enabling rules on an ongoing basis. As amended in 2013, the New York
Not-for-Profit Corporation Act mandates that directors of corporations with
twenty or more employees and revenues in excess of $1 million in the prior
fiscal year adopt and oversee the implementation of compliance policies
with whistleblower components. 22 As amended, the Act mandates the
contents of whistleblower policies: policies must (1) protect against
retaliation, persons "who report suspected improper conduct"; (2) provide
for a designated administrator who shall be a director, officer, or employee;
and (3) assure that the subject of a whistleblower complaint is not present
for deliberations concerning it.' 2 3 Still open to dispute is whether the
statutory provision supports an implied private cause of action for
whistleblowing employees who suffer retaliation. 2 4
Reconsidering the governance role of whistleblowers is consistent with
these recent indicia of evolution in corporate law and governance.
Consistent with Ronald Gilson's observation, legislatures as well as courts
specify the law further when "self-generated governance is less than social
welfare demands." 125 In this light, scholarship that premises corporate
governance as singly focused on agency costs stemming from misaligned
incentives as between shareholders and managers can seem dated or
incomplete.1 2 6 Likewise, understanding governance as a purely internal
arrangement that does not generate substantial effects on third parties that

122. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021). The amendment, part of the
Non-Profit Revitalization Act of 2013, also applies to the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Non-Profit
Revitalization Act of 2013, ch. 549, 2013 N.Y. Laws 1400. A further amendment in 2016 eliminated a
requirement that whistleblower policies be overseen and adopted only by independent directors. Act of

Nov. 28, 2016, ch. 466, sec. 11, § 715-b(b)(2), 2016 N.Y. Laws 947, 951. By mandating the adoption of
whistleblower policies, the amendment goes further than IRS Form 990 for charitable non-profits, which
asks whether the organization has a whistleblower policy. See Jean Gordon Carter, Best Practicesfor

Exempt OrganizationsandForm 990, J. OF ACCT. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.joumalofaccountancy.co
m/issues/20 10/sep/20102725.html [https://perma.cc/G4D5-V7KA]. These provisions (and the Form 990
question) complement a portion of SOX, which imposes criminal liability in the event of retaliation
against whistleblowers who report federal offences and in the event of destruction of records with intent
to obstruct a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1519.
123. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021).

124.

See Joshi v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in N.Y., No. 17-CV-4112, 2018 WL 2417846, at *11

(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2018) (implying private cause of action given statute's express concern with
employees of non-profits and noting split between state-court cases). Compare Pietra v. Poly Prep

Country Day Sch., No. 506586/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2016) (implying cause of action), with Ferris
v. Lustgarten Found., No. 606353/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2017) (declining to imply cause of action).
125. Gilson, supranote 1, at 8.
126. See Christopher M. Bruner, Methods of Comparative Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Afra Afsharipour & Martin Gelter eds.,
forthcoming June 2021) (manuscript at 9) (on file with author).
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cannot be addressed by other bodies of law or regulation can slight the
contemporary significance of internal compliance systems and processes. 27
B. Whistleblowers as GovernanceActors
Repositioned as governance actors, whistleblowers could better facilitate
corporate compliance with positive law. This objective entails focusing on
internal reporting because it serves as a more immediate source of
information to inform managerial decisions and the board.128
Whistleblowers might formally be designated governance actors through
two routes: one specific to particular firms, the other more general. As some
corporations have done,129 whistleblowing could be made a duty imposed
by individual firms on employees and other agents. What the duty would
specifically require, and how the corporation handles whistleblower reports,
would fall within the decision-making province of individual firms.
Alternatively (or additionally), state-level organizational law could address
whistleblowing, imposing requirements comparable to those in the New
York statute discussed above. 3 0 Changes at the level of organizational law
would assure greater uniformity, at least for internal whistleblowing, and
may more effectively engage the attention of boards of directors and senior
management. What both routes share is their potential to signal-to
potential whistleblowers, their colleagues, and audiences external to the
corporation-that reporting potential wrongdoing is compatible with the
corporation's own norms, thereby helping to offset reluctance to report and
reduce the adverse extra-legal consequences anticipated and borne by many
whistleblowers. Both routes, like formal measures more generally,
"signalize" (in Lon Fuller's term) the appropriateness of certain conduct.13 1
Both have potential to defuse the effect of cultural inhibitions against
rewrite extra-legal (or
reporting potential wrongdoing and to offset if not
32
cultural) understandings of "what is 'not done.""1

127. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 108, at 2079 (stating that "corporate governance arrangements
both are and ought to be the product of a bargain between shareholders and managers," in contrast to
compliance, externally imposed pursuant to "the directive of a government enforcer").
128. The independent value of external reporting is beyond the scope of this article, as are the
complex causal links between it and internal reporting.
129. See Miller, supra note 4, at 996.
130. See supratext accompanying notes 122-124.
131. For the "signalize" term, see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
799, 801 (1941). Fuller's specific focus is the functions served by the formal consideration requirement
for contract formation, but his point reaches more broadly.
132. On culture in the context of corporate governance as a widely known and often unspoken
understanding of "what goes with what" and "[w]hat is 'not done,"' see Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law
in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra
note 1, at 129, 131.
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Addressing whistleblowing through state-level organizational law has
the stronger prospect for enlisting the attention of directors and senior
management because amendments to foundational organizational statutes
can impose mandates on the board itself. This route may additionally hold
more promise in circumstances in which some directors and CEOs could be
tempted to suppress whistleblowers' reports or avoid their implications
because it underscores the linkage between whistleblowing policies and
legal compliance, as well as their institutional gravity. To be sure, aspects
of implementation would be delegated, whether to board committees,
officers, or deeper within the organization, but the initial and non-delegable
responsibility concerning system design should be the board's. Further
gravitas could be associated with a whistleblowing system if a committee
of the board-perhaps the audit committee or a committee charged with risk
management-bore explicit responsibility for ongoing monitoring and
reporting to the entire board.
Additionally, enlisting organs of governance at this level could increase
the likelihood that whistleblower reports are used more effectively,
regardless of which personnel bear front-line responsibility for initial
investigations. Failure to make good use of such reports is an ongoing
refrain in retrospective studies of corporate scandals. Veronica Root
Martinez identifies the significance of informational silos in large
organizations, aggravated by one-by-one investigations of whistleblower
reports unaccompanied by aggregation. 33 Thus, although Wells Fargo had
robust compliance programs based on the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, the bank became known as an exemplar of persistent and
avoidable misconduct, evidenced in retrospect by whistleblower reports of
retaliation against employees who attempted to alert their superiors to
fraudulent activity. 134 And cross-silo patterns suggestive of failed incentive
structures and weak internal controls went unidentified.1 35 Reducing the
height of information silos and imposing the broader analytic perspective
requisite to aggregation require direction and support from senior levels,
which a mandatory role for the board and a board committee should
facilitate.
Finally, state-level organizational law is the source of directors' duties,
including the Caremark and Marchand duties to monitor detailed above.
Ongoing concern at the board level with a corporation's compliance with
positive law and regulation would be facilitated by more effective structures
and practices concerning whistleblowing, which through its propensity to
create friction can supplement and correct information the board otherwise
133.

Martinez, supra note 2, at 294.

134.

Id. at 252 n.6.

135. Id. at 257, 291.
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receives, including that traceable to more routinized compliance functions.
Additionally, developments in jurisprudence like Marchand, along with
changes in organizational statutes, generally require advice from counsel to
the board, as would compliance with a mandate to adopt and administer a
system to engage with reports from whistleblowers. All should strengthen
the ability of counsel to give advice underlining the importance of engaging
with the efficacy of compliance.
CONCLUSION

Corporate law and corporate governance are mutable and porous, not
static and closed. These properties enable them to respond to changed
circumstances, which at present include assessments that many internal
compliance systems have not proven adequate to meet the challenge of
deterring and detecting corporate misconduct. Whistleblowers
prototypically denizens of the tiled world who reveal information that
confounds accounts endorsed by higher-ups in the carpeted world-hold
promise as resources. Academic accounts of corporate governance and the
actors who populate governance structures should no longer exclude them.
Nor should formal organizational law.

